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Abstract 
 
DECREASED COGNITIVE FUNCTIONING IN DEPRESSION: A RESULT OF 
INHERENT DEFICITS OR A BY-PRODUCT OF EMOTION REGULATION?  
Kathryn Hardin 
B.S., Northeastern University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson: Lisa Emery 
 
 
 Past research has found that depression is associated with both increased rumination 
and decreased memory ability. Some researchers think that rumination may increase 
cognitive load and consequently might impair memory ability directly. The purpose of the 
present study, therefore, was to determine if rumination might cause the memory deficits that 
are found in depression. In this study, 100 young adult participants were first asked to 
verbally describe a recent emotionally upsetting negative event to the experimenter. After 
telling the story, participants were randomly assigned to either ruminate (rumination 
condition) or were given no further instruction (control condition). All participants then 
completed parts of the Wechsler Memory Scale – Fourth Edition (WMS-IV) to measure 
verbal and visual memory. Participants also completed several questionnaires, including the 
Beck Depression Inventory-II to measure depressive symptoms and the Ruminative 
Response Scale to measure habitual rumination. Contrary to the hypothesis, there were no 
significant differences in visual or verbal memory scores between the rumination and control 
v	
conditions, and depressive symptoms did not moderate the effect. In addition, and in contrast 
to previous literature, there was no relationship between depression and memory 
performance, and a small positive correlation between memory and habitual rumination. 
These results suggest that rumination may not be as cognitively harmful as previously 
theorized. 
Keywords: cognition, memory, depression, emotion regulation, rumination  
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Abstract 
Past research has found that depression is associated with both increased rumination and 
decreased memory ability. Some researchers think that rumination may increase cognitive 
load and consequently might impair memory ability directly. The purpose of the present 
study, therefore, was to determine if rumination might cause the memory deficits that are 
found in depression. In this study, 100 young adult participants were first asked to verbally 
describe a recent emotionally upsetting negative event to the experimenter. After telling the 
story, participants were randomly assigned to either ruminate (rumination condition) or were 
given no further instruction (control condition). All participants then completed parts of the 
Wechsler Memory Scale – Fourth Edition (WMS-IV) to measure verbal and visual memory. 
Participants also completed several questionnaires, including the Beck Depression Inventory-
II to measure depressive symptoms and the Ruminative Response Scale to measure habitual 
rumination. Contrary to the hypothesis, there were no significant differences in visual or 
verbal memory scores between the rumination and control conditions, and depressive 
symptoms did not moderate the effect. In addition, and in contrast to previous literature, there 
was no relationship between depression and memory performance, and a small positive 
correlation between memory and habitual rumination. These results suggest that rumination 
may not be as cognitively harmful as previously theorized. 
 
Keywords: cognition, memory, depression, emotion regulation, rumination  
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Decreased cognitive functioning in depression: A result of inherent deficits or a  
by-product of emotion regulation? 
Depression is one of the most common and debilitating mental illnesses. The World 
Health Organization (2016a) reported that depression affects 350 million people of all ages 
globally, making it the leading cause of disability worldwide and a significant contributor to 
the international burden of disease. The National Institute of Mental Health estimates that 
approximately 6.6% (15.7 million) of adults 18 years old and older in the United States 
experienced at least one major depressive episode in the last year (National Institute of 
Mental Health, n.d.). The prevalence of depression is particularly pronounced in adolescents; 
in 2010-2011, the National Survey on Drug Use and Health reported that the lifetime 
prevalence of a major depressive episode was 12.8% for adolescents aged 12-17, and 8.1% of 
adolescents aged 12-17 experienced a major depressive episode in the last year based on self-
report data (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013). Other reports suggest the 
lifetime and 12-month prevalence rates for adolescents may be slightly lower (e.g., the 
National Survey of Children’s Health and the National Health Interview Survey reported a 
7.1% lifetime prevalence rate and a 5.1% rate for the past year; Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2013).  
According to the DSM-5, major depressive episodes are marked by a significant 
decrease in mood, interest, and/or pleasure lasting a minimum of two weeks (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Depressive episodes may also include changes in weight and 
appetite, disrupted sleep, psychomotor agitation or retardation, loss of energy, feelings of 
worthlessness or guilt, impaired concentration, and reoccurring thoughts of death (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Thoughts of death may include suicidal ideation without a 
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specific plan, a plan for committing suicide, or a suicide attempt. Globally, more than 
800,000 people commit suicide every year (World Health Organization, 2016b). Among 15 
to 29 year olds, suicide was the second leading cause of death worldwide in 2012 (World 
Health Organization, 2016b).   
Due to its prominence across the world, research has focused on better understanding 
depression and developing effective treatments to effectively minimize or eradicate 
depressive symptoms. Past research has found evidence supporting two relationships relevant 
to the current study.  
 First, Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) has been associated with cognitive deficits, 
particularly in attention, memory, and executive function (Baune, Fuhr, Air, & Hering, 2014; 
Rock, Roiser, Riedel, & Blackwell, 2013; Trivedi & Greer, 2014). However, the origin of 
these deficits is a topic of debate. It is not clear if cognitive deficits are a core symptom of 
depression or if cognitive deficits are a byproduct of other symptoms.  
Second, depressive symptoms positively correlate with ruminative thoughts. Multiple 
research studies have found that individuals who ruminate more exhibit more depressive 
symptoms (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999), more extreme depressive symptoms (Morrow 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), and longer-lasting 
depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) than individuals who ruminate less.  
 In most of the existing research, these two relationships (between depression and 
cognitive deficits, and between depression and rumination) have been studied independently. 
Recently, researchers have proposed potential interrelationships among these three variables.  
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 For example, Joormann and colleagues (Joormann, 2010; Joormann & D’Avanzato, 
2010; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010) argued that depression is associated with inherent deficits in 
cognitive inhibition. This hinders the ability to remove irrelevant negative content from 
working memory, thus leading to ruminative thoughts and maintenance or worsening of 
negative mood. Conversely, Williams and colleagues (2007) argued that deficits in executive 
function and deleterious rumination are separable problems, but may interact in predicting 
the course and/or severity of depression.  
A third, less studied possibility is that rumination may mediate the relationship 
between depression and cognitive functioning, such that cognitive deficits are a byproduct of 
increased rumination in depression. One small study has found initial support for this theory 
(Watkins & Brown, 2002), but the possibility has not been otherwise pursued.  
The present research aimed to disentangle these relationships using combined 
experimental and correlational methods. The experimentally induced effects of rumination on 
auditory memory (immediate and delayed) and visual memory (immediate and delayed) were 
examined in people with varying levels of depressive symptoms. Based on the research 
reviewed below, I hypothesized that experimentally induced rumination would impair verbal 
memory and that depressive symptoms would be more highly correlated with memory ability 
in the control conditions.  
Emotions and Emotion Regulation 
Before understanding emotion regulation, it is necessary to formally define emotions. 
Though the term is used colloquially, the field of psychology has long debated the proper 
conceptualization of emotions (e.g., Izard, 2010; Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981). In this 
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paper, emotions will be discussed in terms of the modal model of emotions, as described by 
Gross (2014).  
According to the modal model of emotions, the emotion generation process begins 
when a situation arises. Situations can be external events (e.g., being yelled at by a boss) or 
internal events (e.g., worrying about a future event). Once a situation arises, a person attends 
to it, appraises it, and responds accordingly. The response impacts the situation and the cycle 
repeats itself. It is important to note that emotions are differentiated from moods. Emotions 
are the result of a sequential process following an event while moods are longer lasting and 
generally lack a specific trigger. Thus, sadness is an emotion, whereas depression is a mood. 
Emotion regulation is the process through which individuals are able to influence the 
content, timing, and expression of their emotions, both intentionally and unintentionally 
(Gross, 1998a). The process model of emotion regulation (see Figure 1) expands on the 
modal model of emotions by identifying five types of emotion regulation based on where in 
the emotion generation process they occur: situation selection, situation modification, 
attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation (Gross, 2014). More 
broadly, these five types of emotion regulation can be categorized as either antecedent 
focused strategies (situation selection through cognitive change) or response-focused 
strategies (response modulation).  
 Antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategies occur early in the process model of 
emotion regulation, prior to an emotional response (Gross, 1998b). For example, one may 
choose which situations to engage with or attend to during the first three steps of the process 
model (situation selection, situation modification, and attentional deployment). In the fourth 
stage of the process model of emotion regulation (cognitive change) one may engage in 
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reappraisal by construing an emotional situation in a less emotional or upsetting way prior to 
the emotional response (Richards & Gross, 2000). 
Alternatively, response-focused emotion regulation strategies occur at the end of the 
process model of emotion regulation, once the initial emotion has already been evoked. 
Response-focused emotion regulation strategies attempt to manipulate the resulting output of 
the emotion, potentially by prolonging or diminishing the emotion (Gross, 1998a).  
For example, yesterday, Fred was laid off due to job cuts from the company he had 
worked at for 10 years. When he wakes up this morning, he remembers he is out of work. 
Before developing an emotional reaction, Fred could employ an antecedent-focused emotion 
regulation strategy, such as reappraisal, to change his cognitions about the event. In this case, 
Fred would frame being fired as a more positive event and focus on the opportunity to 
explore new career options. Conversely, if Fred used a response-focused emotion regulation 
strategy, he would have an initial negative reaction to remembering he was fired and would 
then try to alter his emotions. In this case, Fred may ruminate about the event by persistently 
thinking about his feelings of sadness and failure that arose from losing his job.  
Rumination as Emotion Regulation 
Rumination is characterized by the repetition of negative thoughts and feelings after 
negative stimuli and, thus, is a response-focused emotion regulation strategy. Ruminative 
thoughts are passive, rather than active, and typically lack productive problem solving 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyuboirsky, 2008). Instead, ruminative thoughts focus 
primarily on emotional reactions to negative stimuli (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Ruminative 
thoughts can persist in the absence of environmental stimuli for the cognitions (Martin & 
COGNITION AND RUMINATION IN DEPRESSION   
	
8 
Tesser, 1996). As a result, rumination can also trigger subsequent negative emotions that 
would not otherwise occur.  
Ruminative thoughts have been compared to negative cognitive styles and automatic 
thoughts, which have been well studied by cognitive psychologists (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008). However, ruminative thoughts differ from negative cognitions in that the primary 
concern with negative cognitions is the content of thought (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 
1979), whereas the primary concern in ruminative thoughts is the style of thought. A 
ruminative response style is a set of thoughts and behaviors that inhibit an individual’s ability 
to improve their mood by focusing attention inward on emotions.  
Prior research has identified two components of rumination: reflection and brooding 
(Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). A growing body of research confirms that 
brooding and reflection are independent factors of rumination and that reflection has adaptive 
components while brooding does not (e.g., Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Joormann, Dkane, & 
Gotlib, 2006; Schoofs, Hermans, Raes, 2010). Reflection is hypothesized to assist in problem 
solving and has been described as the “purposeful turning inward to engage in cognitive 
problem solving to alleviate one’s depressive symptoms” (Treynor et al., 2003). Similarly, 
the analytic rumination hypothesis (Andrews & Thomson, 2009) proposes that depression 
occurs because of a problem in someone’s life, and reflective rumination is aimed at solving 
this problem.   According to this hypothesis, depression is like a fever, which temporarily 
sidelines a person so that they can engage in the needed reflective problem solving.   
Conversely, brooding is maladaptive, not goal-oriented, and passively compares one’s 
situation to an unachieved outcome (Treynor et al., 2003). Brooding correlates with increased 
depression, both concurrently and at a one-year follow-up (Treynor et al., 2003). Currently 
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depressed participants score more highly on the brooding subscale of the Ruminative 
Response Scale than formerly depressed, socially anxious, and health control participants 
(Joormann et al., 2006).  
Correlational studies have found a negative relationship between rumination and both 
active problem solving and coping. For example, individuals with high scores on ruminative 
items in a coping measure (the COPE) were significantly less likely to engage in active, 
structured problem solving (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989). Ruminating while in a 
depressed mood has been shown to interfere with generating solutions to life problems 
(Morrow, 1990 as cited in Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). These findings corroborate the theory 
that rumination interferes with problem solving. 
Rumination and Depression 
The use, and resulting effects, of various emotion regulation strategies in the 
development and maintenance of psychopathology is of increasing interest to mental health 
professionals (e.g., Berking & Wupperman, 2012). As previously suggested, one of the most 
concerning facets of rumination may be its close relationship to depression. Extensive 
research has explored the style, content, and effects of rumination in people with depression.  
For example, one meta-analysis of 114 studies examined the relationship between 
emotion regulation strategies and four psychopathological disorders (anxiety, depression, 
eating, and substance-related disorders; Aldao et al., 2010). Increased psychopathology was 
associated with increased usage of maladaptive emotion regulation strategies and decreased 
usage of adaptive strategies. A correlation with a large effect size was found between 
psychopathology and scores on self-report rumination measures (r = .49); the effect size 
increased when psychopathology was narrowed to depressive symptoms (r = .55). Increased 
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psychopathology correlated with two other maladaptive emotion regulation strategies with 
medium to large effect sizes: avoidance (r = .38) and suppression (r = .34). Increased 
psychopathology negatively correlated with two adaptive emotion regulation strategies: 
problem solving (r = -.31) and reappraisal (r = -.14). Problem solving negatively correlated 
with depression (r = -.33), providing further evidence that rumination may interfere with 
effective problem solving.  
Interestingly, the positive relationship between maladaptive strategies and 
psychopathology is consistently stronger than the negative relationship between adaptive 
strategies and psychopathology (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012). This suggests that it is 
the use of maladaptive strategies, rather than the “disuse” of adaptive ones, that is the larger 
problem for people with depression. Strategies with maladaptive features, such as 
rumination, may have the dual effect of both directly influencing mood, and indirectly 
influencing it by occupying resources that would otherwise be used for more adaptive 
strategies. For example, Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) theorizes that rumination augments and 
prolongs depression by allowing thinking to be negatively biased by a depressed mood, 
initiating a spiral of negative thoughts. Negative thoughts then capture the depressed person’s 
attention and prevent its use for more productive behavior, such as problem solving. As such, 
people who respond to depression with rumination by focusing on depressive symptoms, 
their causes, and their consequences have longer episodes of depression than people who do 
not ruminate about depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).  
The correlation between rumination and depression remains stable over time and has 
been well documented in short-term longitudinal studies (e.g., lasting 1-1.5 years), and may 
indicate a bi-directional causal relationship. One study measured levels of rumination and 
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depressive symptoms at two time points: baseline and a one-year follow-up (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 1999). Results indicated that at both time points, higher levels of rumination 
correlated with increased depressive symptoms and that depressive symptoms at the first time 
point predicted rumination levels at the second time point. Another study found that 
participants who engaged in more rumination after the loss of a loved one reported increased 
depressive symptoms over 18 months than those who engaged in less rumination (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Davis, 1999). Similarly, a separate study measured levels of rumination and 
depressive symptoms one and six months after the loss of a loved one. At both time points, 
more depressed participants reported higher levels of rumination. Ruminative coping styles 
were associated with higher levels of depression after six months (Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, 
& Larson, 1994). In conjunction with other similar studies, these findings demonstrate the 
stable positive relationship between rumination and depressive symptoms over time, 
signifying that a ruminative coping style is a prominent feature of depression.  
 Experimental research supports Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) theory that rumination can 
both prolong and deepen depressed moods. Participants induced to feel sad report feeling 
significantly more depressed after ruminating than after completing a distraction task 
(Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990), evidencing that rumination can deepen a sad mood. 
This pattern is mirrored in people with depression. In a similar paradigm, participants with 
depression who experienced no mood induction reported feeling significantly more depressed 
after ruminating than participants who completed a distraction task (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991). These findings imply that rumination adversely affects preexisting depressed 
moods. Rumination and depressed affect are likely a vicious cycle; depressive thoughts spark 
passive rumination, which fails to improve affect, which activates more passive rumination.  
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Ruminative response styles can also predict the presence and onset of depressive 
symptoms. Individuals who reported ruminating in response to a depressed mood prior to a 
traumatic event were more likely to be depressed 10 days and 7 weeks after the event (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), suggesting that preexisting ruminative response styles can 
interact with environmental events and lead to depression. 
Furthermore, a longitudinal study by Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) investigated the 
relationship between rumination and depression. In the study, a clinician conducted two 90-
minute sessions with participants, approximately one year apart. The study resulted in three 
important findings. First, participants who were diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder 
during the initial interview had higher scores on a rumination measure at both time points. 
Second, higher rumination scores during the first interview significantly predicted the onset 
of Major Depressive Disorder at the second time point, even after controlling for baseline 
depressive symptoms. This implies that rumination increases the likelihood of depression. 
Third, individuals who were diagnosed with depression during the first interview but not 
during the second interview had significantly lower scores on the rumination scale than 
participants who remained depressed, before controlling for baseline levels of depressive 
symptoms. Together, these findings establish that rumination is an integral part of 
depression; increased rumination may lead to depression and decreased rumination in a 
depressed individual may assist in recovery from a depressive episode.  
Cognitive Effects of Rumination 
 Research investigating emotion regulation independent of psychopathology 
demonstrates that rumination (and other maladaptive strategies) can have other detrimental 
effects, not just on mood, but also on cognitive ability. The theory that emotion regulation 
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can have cognitive consequences is rooted in Baumeister’s ego-depletion model (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Richards & Gross, 2000). The ego-depletion model 
postulates that executive functions such as choice, active responses, and self-regulation 
require underlying, limited cognitive resources (Baumeister et al., 1998). According to this 
model, self-regulation uses a portion of executive functioning resources. The amount of 
resources consumed is dependent upon the difficulty of the self-regulation task. The 
analytical rumination hypothesis also suggests that attentional control allocates limited 
cognitive resources to problem-solving, which compromises other goals (such as 
performance on laboratory tasks; Andrews & Thomson, 2009).  
Several studies have investigated the effects of emotion regulation on executive 
functioning. These studies generally find that rumination has adverse effects on working 
memory and other executive functions. For example, one correlational study examined the 
relationship between ruminative tendencies (measured by a shortened version of the 
Ruminative Responses Scale) and 1) working memory (measured by the Backward Digit 
Span) and 2) cognitive flexibility (measured by the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test) in college 
students (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), with depression (as measured by the Beck 
Depression Inventory) as a covariate. Individuals with high scores on the Ruminative 
Response Scale (ruminators) made more perseverative errors on the Wisconsin Card Sort 
than individuals with low scores on the Ruminative Response Scale (nonruminators), 
indicating that ruminators have less cognitive flexibility than nonruminators.  There was no 
significant effect of ruminative tendencies on working memory (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000). One limitation of this study was that participants’ ruminative behavior was not 
measured during cognitive tasks. Thus, Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema’s (2000) study presents 
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interesting findings about the potential long-term association of rumination and cognitive 
flexibility, but does not address what effects rumination may cause at the time of occurrence. 
In addition, participants’ scores on the Beck Depression Inventory were included as 
covariates in their analyses, which may have reduced the relationship between rumination 
and working memory capacity.  
One recent quasi-experimental study addressed some of these (Curci, Lanciano, 
Soleti, & Rimé, 2013). In the study, researchers placed participants into a high or low 
working memory capacity group based on performance on a Random Number Generation 
task. They then presented participants with either a negative or neutral mood induction prior 
to their completing a second working memory task.  Ruminative behaviors were measured 
with the Rumination Response Scale (RRS) after the task. Scores on the RRS were higher in 
the negative mood condition than the neutral mood condition, a finding that was exacerbated 
for participants with a low working memory capacity. Individuals with high rumination 
scores and low working memory capacity were less successful on the working memory task 
than individuals with high rumination scores and high working memory capacity. These 
findings imply that exposure to a negative emotion induction creates a competition for 
cognitive resources between rumination and working memory tasks. That is, because people 
with low working memory capacity have fewer cognitive resources available, they cannot 
simultaneously ruminate and perform a cognitive task. 
Worrying, like rumination, is the repetition of verbal, negative, intrusive thoughts 
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). The difference between rumination and worrying is subtle; 
rumination concentrates primarily on past events, whereas worrying often centers on future 
events. Rumination and worrying have similar ramifications; both have been associated with 
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increased negative affect and have been observed in depression. Furthermore, the cognitive 
tolls of worrying and rumination are similar and rely on a similar set of cognitive processes. 
Like rumination, worrying relies on the phonological loop, which maintains verbal material, 
such as words and stories, typically through subvocal thought rehearsal.  
One study examined the effects of worrying on verbal and visual memory (Moreno, 
Ánvila-Souza, Gomes, & Gauer, 2015). Participants were divided into high-worriers and 
low-worriers based on their scores on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire. Participants were 
categorized as high-worriers if they scored from the third quartile and low-worriers if they 
scored up to the first quartile. High-worriers were less accurate than low-worriers on a verbal 
memory task. Additionally, high-worriers were less efficient (as measured by slower reaction 
times) than low-worriers on a visuospatial memory task. The authors argued that typical 
thoughts of worry were the major occupant of working memory in the high-worry group, 
leaving fewer mental resources available for the verbal and visuospatial tasks in the study.  
Cognitive Deficits in Depression 
Cognitive deficits similar to those found in rumination research are also commonly 
found in people with depression. Although depression is primarily conceptualized as a mood 
disorder, many past studies have found associations between depression and deficits in 
cognition. Most of these studies have found evidence for neuropsychological deficits in 
several domains, including attention, working memory and executive function, processing 
speed, and episodic memory. These deficits are reflected in the DSM-5 criteria for a major 
depressive episode, which includes “diminished ability to think and concentrate” and 
“psychomotor agitation or retardation” as potential symptoms (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).  
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Although there is ample research documenting cognitive deficits in depression, the 
heterogeneity of dependent measures and participant samples (e.g., in age, timecourse of 
disease, medication, etc.) makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions about which cognitive 
functions are impaired and why. Several recent reviews highlight this difficulty and make 
progress towards developing a more nuanced understanding of cognition in depression 
(Baune et al., 2014; Rock et al., 2013; Trivedi & Greer, 2014).  
Rock et al. (2013) investigated cognitive functioning in participants ranging from 
approximately 12-80 years old with depression during symptomatic and remitted states. The 
meta-analysis included only studies that used the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test 
Automated Battery (CANTAB). Including studies that measure cognitive ability with a single 
neuropsychology test battery ensures interstudy homogeneity and may help elucidate which 
cognitive abilities are most impaired. This meta-analysis included four tests of executive 
function (One Touch Stockings of Cambridge, Spatial Working Memory, Intra-Extra 
Dimensional Set Shift, and Spatial Span), four tests of memory (Delayed Matching to 
Sample, Paired Associates Learning, Pattern Recognition Memory, and Spatial Recognition 
Memory), one test of attention (Rapid Visual Information Processing), and one test of 
reaction time (Reaction Time) from the CANTAB. The executive function tests 
predominately measure working memory, cognitive flexibility, and spatial planning. The 
memory section primarily targets visual memory and pattern recognition. The Rapid Visual 
Information Processing test is a measure of sustained attention and Reaction Time measures 
motor and mental response speeds.  
 Compared to healthy controls, participants with depression displayed impaired 
attention (Cohen’s d = -0.65), executive function (Cohen’s d ranged from -0.34 to -0.54), and 
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memory (Cohen’s d ranged from -0.40 to -0.50). The authors concluded that depression 
significantly correlates with moderate deficits in executive function, memory, and attention 
(Rock et al., 2013). Though these conclusions are valuable, it is important to consider 
reviews and meta-analyses that use heterogeneous dependent measures.  
A more diverse review focused on cognition in early/first episode Major Depressive 
Disorder (Trivedi & Greer, 2014).  Pooled effect sizes found significant deficits in attention 
(effect size 0.36) and visual learning/memory (effect size 0.53). Trivedi and Greer concluded 
that cognitive impairments are present at the onset of depression and remain relatively stable 
as the illness progresses. Two studies included in this review highlight this conclusion.  
One study compared brain activation of young adults, who were either at a high or 
low risk for depression, during a working memory task (Mannie, Harmer, Cowen, & 
Norbury, 2010). There were no significant differences in accuracy or response latency 
between the high-risk and low-risk groups, indicating that high- and low-risk individuals 
perform equally on a standardized test of working memory (n-back). However, high-risk 
participants showed greater activation in regions of the brain associated with working 
memory. The authors postulate that differing neural responses of high-risk participants to a 
working memory task might be a vulnerability marker of depression. The second study found 
that non-depressed participants with low episodic memory scores on a free + cued recall 
memory task were at a higher risk for having a diagnosis of depression three years later. The 
authors concluded that low episodic memory performance may be a premorbid marker of 
depression (Airaksinen, Wahlin, Forsell, & Larsson, 2007).  
Because much of the past research on cognitive deficits in depression focused on 
adult or older-adult samples, a recent review centered on neuropsychological functioning in 
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Major Depressive Disorder occurring in adolescence and early adulthood. Baune et al. (2014) 
reviewed seven studies to better understand the impairment of individual cognitive domains 
in depression.  Four studies included a measure of working memory; two of these studies 
found working memory impairments with medium to large effect sizes (Klimkeit, Tonge, 
Bradshaw, Melvin, & Gould, 2011; Matthews, Coghill, & Rhodes, 2008). Two other studies 
found no relationship between working memory deficits and depression (Baune, Czira, 
Smith, Mitchell, & Sinnamon, 2012; Korhonen et al., 2002). Visual memory was measured 
in two studies; one found significant differences between depressed and control groups with 
large effect sizes (Matthews et al., 2008) and the other found no significant relationship 
(McClure, Rogeness, & Thompson, 1997). Only one study included a measure of attention 
and found no significant differences between depressed and nondepressed participants (Kyte, 
Goodyear, & Sahakian, 2005). Three studies measured verbal learning and memory, however 
none found significant differences between non-depressed and depressed groups.  
Because other meta-analyses have found significant impairments in attention, verbal 
memory, and working memory, further research is necessary to understand these cognitive 
abilities in depression. For example, it is possible that verbal and episodic memory deficits 
may not appear until later in adulthood, while working memory and processing speed are 
more impacted in young adulthood and adolescents.  
Across reviews, there is convincing evidence for processing speed and attention 
deficits in people who are depressed, and some evidence for analogous working memory 
deficits. Because researchers define working memory in multiple ways, some of which 
overlap with other cognitive domains, it is difficult to determine the strength of the 
relationship between working memory and depression. In contrast to other domains, evidence 
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for depression-related episodic memory deficits is less consistent and less studied. The 
association between episodic memory deficits and depression does appear to be stronger in 
adult and older-adult samples. This may be, however, a result of episodic memory being 
measured more frequently in adult and older-adult samples.  
Though impaired cognitive functioning is often observed in people with depression, 
research has been unable to conclusively determine whether cognitive deficits are a core 
feature of depression. Across the literature, the cognitive domains studied, effect sizes, and 
methodologies vary, sometimes resulting in conflicting findings for which domains are 
impaired. The variability of outcomes may be in part a result of inconsistent diagnosis 
conditions, treatment status, and severity of depression (McClintock, Husain, Greer, & 
Cullum, 2010).   
Further complicating the issue, some studies have found medication improves 
cognitive deficits observed in people with depression (Herrera-Gurzmán et al., 2010; 
Wagner, Doering, Helmreich, Lieb, & Tadic, 2012), whereas other studies have found an 
association between antidepressant use and poor cognitive abilities such as working memory 
and verbal learning and ability (Lee, Hermens, Porter, & Redoblado-Hodge, 2012). It is 
difficult to determine the effects of antidepressant medication on cognitive functioning in 
depression because medication use covaries with other variables, such as treatment status and 
severity of symptoms.  
Finally, determining the causes for cognitive deficits in people with depression is 
further complicated by other symptoms of the disorder (such as amotivation and reduced 
ability to cope with interference). Thus, despite a large body of research demonstrating a 
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relationship between depression and cognitive deficits, there is little certainty about the 
nature of these deficiencies. 
Relationship Between Rumination, Depression, and Cognitive Deficits 
There are at least two potential theories connecting rumination, depression, and 
cognitive deficits. The first and more heavily researched theory suggests that cognitive 
deficits in depressed people, specifically decreased cognitive inhibition, result in increased 
rumination (Joormann, 2010; Joormann & D’Avanzato, 2010; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010). A 
second and less examined theory postulates that increased rumination (which is cognitively 
taxing) in people with depression leads to cognitive deficits (Watkins & Brown, 2002).  
Joormann (2010) conceptualizes depression as a disorder of impaired emotion 
regulation due to deficits in inhibitory function. Under this conceptualization, inhibition is an 
executive function that affords control over working memory by enabling the selection and 
updating of its contents.  Optimal working memory performance relies on high levels of 
inhibitory control; if inhibitory control is weakened, other cognitive processes such as 
learning, retrieval, and comprehension may be negatively affected (Hasher, Zacks, & May, 
1999). Joormann postulates that poor cognitive inhibition exacerbates depressive symptoms 
through its impact on rumination (Joormann & D’Avanzato, 2010).  
According to this theory, in the presence of negative stimuli, effective cognitive 
inhibition blocks negative thoughts and accesses mood-incongruent material, which 
decreases negative thoughts and increases positive thoughts in working memory. This 
enables recovery from a negative mood. In contrast, ineffective cognitive inhibition fails to 
decrease negative material in working memory and often accesses mood-congruent 
(negative) material. Negative thoughts in working memory increase, resulting in mood 
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maintenance or intensifying. Joormann and D’Avanzato (2010) suggest that poor cognitive 
inhibition may result in rumination and prevent the use of more adaptive emotion regulation 
strategies, such as reappraisal.  
As discussed previously, there is some evidence that rumination is associated with 
increased perseveration on cognitive tasks, which is in line with Joorman’s theory. To more 
specifically test whether rumination is associated with reduced inhibition of negative 
information, Joormann and Gotlib (2010) had depressed and non-depressed participants 
complete a negative affective priming task in order to measure their ability to cognitively 
inhibit negative stimuli. Compared to non-depressed participants, depressed participants 
exhibited a lack of inhibition for negative stimuli when processing negative material during 
the negative affective priming task. Participants without depression and participants with 
remitted depression more successfully inhibited negative material during the negative 
affective priming task than depressed participants. Furthermore, reduced inhibition of 
negative material in depressed participants correlated with increased rumination. These 
findings support Joormann’s proposed hypothesis that depression is associated with 
decreased cognitive inhibition and increased rumination. 
Although this study is consistent with the hypothesis that cognitive deficits cause 
rumination (e.g., they are associated), it cannot rule out alternative causal explanations for 
the association. In particular, it is also possible that rumination causes cognitive deficits. To 
my knowledge, little research has investigated this theory. One study investigated the 
possibility of rumination causing or exacerbating impairments in executive tasks in people 
with depression (Watkins & Brown, 2002). A 2 (group: depressed, non-depressed) x 2 
(condition: rumination, distraction) design compared participants’ accuracy on a random 
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number generation (RNG) task. All participants were induced into a sad mood by thinking 
about a recent personal difficulty for five minutes. Participants then completed the RNG task 
in a rumination condition (“think about what your feelings might mean”) and a distraction 
condition (“think about the shape of a large black umbrella”). The depressed group 
demonstrated impaired performance on the RNG task when ruminating. However, in the 
distraction condition, the depressed and non-depressed groups did not significantly differ on 
their performance on the RNG task. This shows that rumination reduces executive capacity, 
suggesting that executive functioning is not inherently impaired in depression. These findings 
support the present theory that rumination will mediate the relationship between depression 
and cognitive deficits.  
There are a few limitations to Watkins and Brown’s (2002) study. The first is that the 
study had a small sample (n = 28, 14 depressed), which may lead to decreased 
generalizability. The second is that executive functioning was measured with only one 
measure (RNG). Arguably, the RNG task is a poor representation of general executive 
functioning (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999) as it primarily measures executive 
subfunctions, such as inhibition, updating, and monitoring (Peters, Giesbrecht, Jelicic, & 
Merckelbach, 2007). Other facets of cognition, such as memory, that are commonly linked 
with depression and rumination were not measured. As a result, the study did not 
comprehensively measure executive functioning and lacks the ability to validly make claims 
about larger cognitive functioning. Finally, rumination was not compared to a true control 
condition; it was compared to an alternative emotion regulation strategy (distraction). 
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Present Research 
 The current study sought to extend the understanding of the relationship between 
rumination, depressive symptoms, and cognition. The primary hypothesis was derived from 
three themes in the literature: depression correlates with both 1) increased rumination and 2) 
with decreased cognitive functioning. Additionally, 3) increased rumination correlates with 
decreased cognitive functioning. Together, these findings suggest that the relationship 
between depression and cognitive deficits may be caused by ruminative behaviors.  
In this study, all participants were first asked to recall a recent negative event. After 
recalling the event, half of the participants were asked to ruminate on the event and half were 
not given further instructions. Then, all participants completed a cognitive battery, including 
tests from the Wechsler Memory Scale – Fourth Edition that individually test auditory and 
visual memory, as well as an additional computerized task of visual working memory. 
Participants also filled out questionnaires to measure their depressive symptoms and habitual 
rumination techniques.  
In accordance with previous findings, I hypothesized that participants who were 
induced to ruminate during the memory tasks would perform worse than participants in the 
control condition. Importantly, I expected that this effect would be larger in participants with 
low levels of depression. I based this prediction on the assumption that people with high 
levels of depressive symptoms would be ruminating regardless of the provided instructions. 
In addition, because verbal memory and rumination rely on the same cognitive processes 
(e.g., the phonological loop), I expected the hypothesized effects to be larger on verbal 
memory than on visual memory. 
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Method 
This study was approved by the Appalachian State University IRB on October 27, 
2016 (IRB #17-0009) and adheres to all ethics principles. See Appendix A for IRB approval 
page and consent form.  
Participants  
 Participants were 100 students recruited from Appalachian State University who 
participated in this study for partial course credit. Prior to beginning the study, it was 
determined that participants would be between 18-23 years of age. Four participants were 
excluded from analyses due to exceeding this designated age range (26, 27, 36, and 54 years 
old), reducing the final sample to 96 participants. Participants ranged from 18-22 years old 
(M = 19.20, SD = 1.14). Of the 96 participants, 71 were female.  
Materials 
Questionnaires. Participants were asked to complete a total of five questionnaires: 
the Brief COPE, the Beck Depression Inventory-II, the Rumination Response Scale, the Beck 
Anxiety Inventory, and a demographics questionnaire.  
Demographics Questionnaire. The demographics questionnaire collected basic 
demographic information including: age, gender, and program of study. Additionally, the 
questionnaire asked participants to self-report current and past mental health diagnoses, 
treatments, and medication use. See Appendix B. 
Beck Depression Inventory-II. The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, 
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) is a common measure of evaluating the presence 
and severity of depressive symptoms. The BDI-II contains 21 self-report statements. 
Participants respond on a scale of 0-3, with higher scores representing greater severity of 
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depressive symptoms. Potential scores range from 0-63. Scores from 0-13 reflect minimal 
depression, scores from 14-19 indicate mild depression, scores from 20-28 indicate moderate 
depression, and scores about 29 indicate severe depression. Normative data from the BDI-II 
interpretation manual indicates that the mean score for college students is 12.56 (SD = 9.93). 
Reliability for the BDI-II in the current sample was α = .73. 
Rumination Response Scale. The Rumination Response Scale (RRS; Treynor et al., 
2003) contains 22 items to measure how often respondents habitually engage in ruminative 
behaviors. Respondents rate the frequency they engage in each statement on a 1-4 Likert 
scale, with higher responses indicating more frequent behavior. The RRS includes behaviors 
such as “think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better”, “think about how sad you 
feel”, and “think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, and mistakes”. Potential scores 
range from 22-88, with higher scores indicating increased rumination. The RRS can also be 
divided into three subcomponents: Depression, Brooding, and Reflection. Depressive 
symptoms are more strongly related to Brooding than to Reflection.  Reliability for the 
overall RRS in the current sample was α = .92. For the subscales, reliability was α = .87 for 
Depression, α = .80 for Brooding, and α = .77 for Reflection. 
Beck Anxiety Inventory. The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, 
& Steer, 1998) asks respondents to indicate how much they have been bothered by 21 
symptoms of anxiety in the last month. Responses are given on a 0-3 scale, ranging from 0 = 
“Not at all to” 3 = “Severely: it bothered me a lot”. The scale includes mental items (“fear of 
losing control”) and physical items (“heart pounding/racing”). Potential scores range from 0-
63, with higher scores indicating increased anxiety. Reliability for the BAI in the current 
sample was α = .90. 
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Brief COPE. The Brief COPE (Carver, 1997) is a shortened measure of the original 
COPE inventory, which assesses a broad range of coping mechanisms individuals may utilize 
to manage their stress. The Brief COPE contains 28 statements about coping responses. 
Respondents indicate how frequently they engage in the coping behavior on a 1-4 Likert 
scale, with higher ratings indicating more frequent use of the coping response. The COPE 
includes a variety of potential responses, such as ‘venting’ (“I’ve been expressing my 
negative feelings”), planning (“I’ve been trying to come up with a strategy about what to 
do”), and behavioral disengagement (“I’ve been giving up the attempt to cope”). The Brief 
COPE was included for exploratory purposes.  
Memory Battery. Participants completed the adult battery from the Wechsler 
Memory Scale – Fourth Edition (WMS-IV; Wechsler, 2009). The WMS-IV is a standardized 
measure of memory and cognition normed for ages 16-69. It contains seven subtests, four of 
which measure both immediate and delayed performance. The subtests can be used to form 
five indexes: auditory memory, visual memory, visual working memory, immediate memory, 
and delayed memory. 
The Wechsler Memory Scale was selected as the primary dependent variable for three 
reasons. First, the measured domains are impaired in people with depression with relative 
consistency and robust effect sizes. Second, past research has demonstrated deficits in 
working memory, visual memory, and verbal memory while engaging in rumination or 
similar processes. Finally, the Wechsler Memory Scale has been used in past depression 
research, (Baune et al., 2014; Trivedi & Greer, 2014).  
All WMS-IV subtests were administered except Spatial Addition, which was replaced 
with Automated Symmetry Span (Oswald, McAbee, Redick, & Hambrick, 2015). This was 
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done to shorten the length of time it took to complete the battery, as pilot testing indicated 
that Spatial Addition took considerably longer than the remaining subtests. Like Spatial 
Addition, Symmetry Span is a test of visuospatial working memory. Although this 
substitution meant that the visual working memory index of the WMS-IV could not be 
calculated, it did not impact the calculation of the Auditory or Visual memory scales, which 
were the primary dependent variables.  
Visual Reproduction I & II. Visual Reproduction assesses memory for nonverbal 
visual stimuli. Visual Reproduction I is a test of immediate visual memory and Visual 
Reproduction II is a test of delayed visual memory. In Visual Reproduction I, participants are 
shown a series of five designs. Designs are presented for 10 seconds individually. After each 
design is presented, the participant is asked to draw the design from memory. Reproductions 
are scored after the testing session has ended. Each potential criterion in the five designs is 
scored independently with a score of 0 or 1, with 1 indicating that the participant correctly 
recalled the criterion. For both Visual Reproduction I and II, the maximum score is 43. 
Visual Reproduction II is administered approximately 20-30 minutes after Visual 
Reproduction I and assesses long-term visual-spatial memory through both free recall and 
recognition tasks. In the recall task, the participant is asked to draw the designs previously 
shown during Visual Reproduction I. Participants may reproduce the designs in any order. 
Reproductions are scored identically to Visual Reproduction I. In the recognition task, 
participants are asked to identify which designs match the original design shown during 
Visual Reproduction I. In the recognition task, answers are scored as 0 or 1, with scores of 1 
indicating a correct response. The maximum score for the recognition task is 7 points.  
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Logical Memory I & II. Logical Memory is a measure of narrative auditory memory. 
Logical Memory I assesses immediate auditory memory and Logical Memory II assesses 
delayed auditory memory. During Logical Memory I, participants hear two short stories. 
Each story contains 25 details. Immediately after hearing each story, participants are asked to 
recall the story to the best of their ability. Participants receive one point per detail correctly 
remembered according to a standard scoring guide. Logical Memory II is administered 20-30 
minutes after Logical Memory I and has both recall and recognition task. During the recall 
task, participants are first asked to recite each story, again being scored by the amount of 
details correctly remembered. In the recognition task, participants answer 15 yes/no 
questions per story. Answers are scored as 0 or 1, with scores of 1 indicating a correct 
response. The maximum score for the recognition task is 30 points. For the free recall 
conditions in Logical Memory I and II, the maximum score is 50 points. 
Verbal Paired Associates I & II. Verbal Paired Associates assesses auditory memory 
for associated word pairs. Verbal Paired Associates I assesses immediate auditory memory 
and Verbal Paired Associates II assesses delayed auditory memory. During Verbal Paired 
Associates I, the experimenter orally reads a list of 14 word pairs to the participant. Some 
word pairs are intuitive (e.g., city, town), while others are random (e.g., day, box). The 
experimenter then reads the first word from each word pair and asks the participant to 
provide the associated word. There are four trials of the same 14 word pairs in different 
orders. Answers are scored on a 0 or 1 scale, with a score of 1 indicating a correct response. 
The maximum score for each trial is 14 points. The maximum score for the total subtest is 56 
points. Verbal Paired Associates II is administered approximately 20-30 minutes after Verbal 
Paired Associates I and assesses delayed memory for verbally paired information through 
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both cued recall and recognition tasks. In the delayed recall task, the experimenter reads the 
first word of each pair and asks the participant to provide the associated word. The scoring 
for the delayed recall task is identical to the immediate recall condition; the maximum score 
is 14 points. In the recognition task, the participant is read a list of word pairs and asked to 
identify which word pairs are part of the original list. Scores in the recognition task are 
scored as either 0 or 1, with 1 indicating a correct response; the maximum score is 40 points.  
Designs I & II. Designs is a measure of visual memory for unfamiliar visual material. 
Designs I is a measure of immediate visual memory and Designs II is a measure of delayed 
visual memory. During Designs I, participants see a grid containing 4-8 designs for 10 
seconds. Once the grid is removed, the participants recreate the grid by selecting designs 
from a set of cards and placing the cards in the appropriate position. This process is repeated 
four times. Participants receive a content, spatial, and bonus score. Content scores range from 
0-2 per card. If the participant fails to identify either the target or distracter card, they receive 
zero points. If the participant identifies the distracter card, they receive 1 point. If the 
participant identifies the target card, they receive 2 points. Spatial scores are either 0 or 1 per 
cell location. A score of 1 indicates that the participant placed any card (correct or incorrect) 
in an appropriate cell. A score of 0 indicates that a participant failed to place a card in a 
correct cell. Bonus points are awarded when the target card is placed in the correct location. 
Designs II is administered approximately 20-30 minutes after Designs I and has both free 
recall and recognition tasks. First, the participant is asked to recreate the designs shown in 
the immediate recall condition. Scoring for the Designs II is identical to Designs II. In the 
recognition portion of Designs II, the experimenter shows the participant a series of grids. 
Participants are asked to identify which two designs are correct and in the same place as in 
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Designs I. Thus, there are two correct responses per item. One point is awarded for each 
correct item, with a maximum of 2 points per item.  
Symbol Span. Symbol Span assesses visual working memory for novel visual stimuli. 
The participant is shown a series of abstract symbols on a page. Then, the participant is asked 
to identify the symbols in order from a greater number of symbols. Answers are scored on a 
0-2 point scale. A score of 0 reflects incorrect answers. A score of 1 indicates that the 
participant has correctly recalled the symbols but in the incorrect order. A score of 2 
indicates that the participant has correctly recalled both the symbols and the order. The 
maximum score is 50 points.  
Symmetry Span. Symmetry Span (Oswald et al., 2015) is an automated computer 
task. Participants are asked to judge whether 8x8 matrices are symmetrical down an 
imaginary vertical axis.  In between each matrix, participants are shown a single red square 
in a 4x4 grid to be remembered at the end of the set. Sets range from 3-5 with two 
administrations for each set size. The task takes approximately 10 minutes to complete.  
Procedure 
After giving informed consent, participants were tested individually in a quiet room 
by a single experimenter. Prior to the experimental portion of the study, the participants filled 
out a portion of the questionnaires (BDI-II, BAI, and demographics). These questionnaires 
were presented at the beginning of the study so that the rumination induction did not 
influence responses and because the IRB protocol required that the experimenter check the 
participants’ responses to the suicidality question of the BDI-II early in the procedure. 
Though there was protocol in place for handling suicidal responses, no participants scored 
highly on the suicidality question and, thus, no further action was necessary.   
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After completing the questionnaires, all participants were asked to describe a recent 
negative event in detail for three to five minutes. If the participant did not speak for at least 
three minutes, then the experimenter asked general prompting questioning (e.g., “what else 
happened during the event?”) All narratives were audio-recorded. Participants were given the 
following instructions: 
I would like you to describe a recent emotionally upsetting negative event. This event 
must be something that occurred to you and should have lasted at least a few minutes, 
but less than one day. For example, an ongoing fight with a friend would not be 
sufficient, but a specific confrontation would work well. As you describe the event, I 
would like you to concentrate on what things happened during the event, including 
what people might have said or did. I would like you to talk about how this made you 
feel and what the consequences of the event may be. 
After the event description, participants in the control condition received no further 
instructions. Participants in the rumination condition received the following instructions:  
While we complete the rest of the study, I would like you to think about your feelings 
about this event, what they might mean, and what might have caused them. After the 
study is over, I will ask you to retell the event. When you are retelling the story, I 
would like you to include the same details as you did now and also include any new 
emotions that may arise while you are thinking about the event. 
Participants then completed the WMS-IV. Approximately halfway through the 
battery, between Logical Memory II and Verbal Paired Associates I, participants completed a 
manipulation check. The manipulation check asked participants to rate “how much they had 
been thinking about their story” on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 6 (constantly). 
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After the cognitive battery, participants were asked to repeat their original memory 
using the following instructions: “I would like you to retell the story you told me at the 
beginning of the study. As you repeat your story, please try your best to include the same 
details as you did before.” Finally, participants completed the RRS and Brief COPE.  These 
questionnaires were presented at the end so as to not influence participants’ emotion 
regulation strategies throughout the study.  
Results 
Score Calculation 
Prior to conducting analyses, scaled scores for the Auditory Memory Index (AMI) 
and Visual Memory Index (VMI) were calculated. The AMI included scores on Logical 
Memory I and II and Verbal Paired Associates I and II. The VMI score included scores on 
Visual Reproductions I and II and Designs I and II. Neither index included scores from the 
recognition part of delayed recall tests. AMI and VMI scores are derived from scores scaled 
for age from the relevant subtest. Scaled scores are summed and converted into a single index 
score for each index. For both indexes, scores range from 40-160, with 100 being the 50th 
percentile. In the current sample, VMI scores ranged from 82 to 136 (M = 104.36, SD = 
11.62) and AMI scores ranged from 58 to 126 (M = 98.06, SD = 11.33).  
Participant Characteristics 
Descriptive statistics for BDI-II, RRS, and BAI scores in the sample are located in 
Table 1. Two participants did not complete the full BDI-II inventory and one participant 
opted to not complete the measure. Of the participants that responded to the measure, 84.9% 
did not meet the cutoff for any levels of depression (n = 79), 8.6% met the criteria for mild 
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depression (14-19 points; n = 8), 5.4% met the criteria for moderate depression (20-28 points; 
n = 5), and 1.1% met the criteria for severe depression (29-63 points; n = 1).  
In addition to completing the BDI-II, participants were asked to self-report whether 
they had a prior or current diagnosis of depression and whether they were currently taking 
antidepressant medication.  The majority of participants (n = 76) reported no history of 
depression, though one of those participants reported taking antidepressant medication. 
Seven participants reported a diagnosis of depression and current symptoms, and six of those 
were taking antidepressants. An additional 12 participants reported a previous diagnosis of 
depression but no current symptoms, and three of those were taking antidepressants. Finally, 
one participant chose not to disclose mental health information. 
Finally, Table 2 presents the average BDI-II scores of the groups described in the 
prior paragraph. Of particular note, among the participants who reported remission of 
depression, those who were taking antidepressant medication had BDI-II scores closer to 
participants with a current diagnosis of depression. Those who were not taking 
antidepressants had scores closer to those with no history of depression.  
Manipulation Check  
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare responses on the 
manipulation check across the two conditions (rumination instructions vs. control 
instructions conditions). As expected, individuals in the rumination condition reported 
thinking more about their narrative during the memory tests (M = 2.37, SD = 1.04) than 
individuals in the control condition (M = 1.92, SD = 1.04), t(93) = 2.12, p = .037, d = .43. 
These results indicate that the rumination manipulation effectively induced participants in the 
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rumination condition to ruminate more during the study than individuals in the control 
condition.  
Planned Analyses 
Auditory Memory. To test the primary hypothesis that depression would moderate 
the impact of the rumination manipulation on auditory memory, I conducted an ANCOVA on 
AMI scores with condition (rumination, control) entered into the model as a factor, BDI-II 
scores entered as a covariate, and an additional Condition x BDI-II interaction term. In this 
analysis, main effects indicate the effects of rumination and depressive symptoms on 
auditory memory independent of each other. The interaction effect tests whether depressive 
symptoms and rumination affect auditory memory together.  
As may be seen in the left portion of Figure 2, the ANCOVA indicated no significant 
main effect of BDI-II, F(1,89) = 0.16, p = .686, ηp2 = .002, no significant main effect of 
Condition, F(1,89) = 0.32, p = .575, ηp2 = .004, and no significant interaction effects between 
BDI-II and Condition, F(1,89) = 0.72, p = .399, ηp2 = .01.   
 Visual Memory. The ANCOVA described above was also conducted using the VMI 
as a dependent variable. As was the case with the AMI, the ANCOVA indicated no 
significant main effects of BDI-II, F(1,89) = .08, p = .78, ηp2 = .001, no significant main 
effects of Condition, F(1,89) = 0.99, p = .32, ηp2 = .01, and no significant interaction effects 
between BDI-II and Condition, F(1,89) = 0.83, p = .36, ηp2 = .01.  
Verbal vs. Visual Memory. Finally, to directly test the hypothesis that both 
Condition and BDI-II scores would impact auditory memory more than visual memory, I 
conducted a repeated-measures ANCOVA on memory scores, with one within-subjects 
variable (Memory Domain: Auditory vs. Visual), one between-subjects variable (Condition: 
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Rumination vs. Control), BDI-II as a continuous covariate, and an additional Condition x 
BDI-II interaction term. 
The ANCOVA indicated a significant main effect of Memory Domain, F(1,94) = 
21.6, p <.001, ηp2 = .11, but no other significant main effects or interactions (all F’s < 1.5, all 
p’s > .25, all ηp2 < .01). Most importantly for the current hypothesis, there was no interaction 
between Memory Domain, Condition, and BDI-II scores, F(1,89) = 0.0002, p = .95, ηp2 = 
.000. Unexpectedly, as reported in the score calculation section above, participants’ VMI 
scores were significantly higher than their AMI scores. Single sample t-tests comparing the 
scores to 100 (the WMS-IV median) found that VMI scores were significantly higher than 
100, t(95) = 3.86, p < .001, but the AMI scores were not significantly lower than 100, t(95) = 
1.54, p = .13. This suggests that the difference in performance across memory domains is due 
to our participants performing better than average on the VMI, rather than being impaired in 
the AMI. 
Supplementary Analyses 
 Experimental Effects Alone. To verify that there were no effects of the 
manipulation, the prior analyses were also conducted without depression as a covariate. The 
rumination manipulation did not significantly affect AMI scores, t(94) = -.312, p = .756. 
Individuals in the rumination condition, M = 97.15, SD = 14.9, did not perform significantly 
different than individuals in the control condition, M = 98, SD = 11.7. The rumination 
manipulation did not significantly affect VMI scores, t(94) = -.82, p = .414. Individuals in the 
rumination condition, M = 103.6, SD = 11.47, did not perform significantly differently than 
individuals in the control condition, M = 105.55, SD = 11.87. 
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 Correlational Analysis. In addition, I conducted correlational analyses to better 
understand the relationship between depression, rumination, and memory (See Table 3). 
Consistent with past research, depression was significantly positively correlated with RRS 
total scores, as well as all three subsections (reflection, depression, and brooding). 
Surprisingly, and in line with the ANCOVA analyses above, I did not replicate past findings 
showing that depressive symptoms were associated with reduced auditory or visual memory.  
 There was also a consistent, small positive relationship between RRS scores and the 
two memory measures, though only the relationship between RRS-Reflection and the AMI 
index was statistically significant. To confirm this unexpected positive association between 
RRS scores and memory, I re-ran the repeated measures ANCOVA with RRS scores as a 
covariate, rather than BDI-II scores. In this analysis, the only significant effect was that of 
RRS on overall memory ability, F(1,92) = 4.88, p = .03. 
  Self-Reported Depression Status. A second set of analyses investigated the effects 
of self-reported depression status on Memory and RRS total scores. First, a 2 (Memory 
Domain: Auditory vs. Visual) x 3 (Depression Status: Current Diagnosis vs. Remitted vs. No 
Diagnosis) ANOVA on memory scores indicated that Depression Status was associated with 
overall memory performance, though the effect was just below statistical significance, 
F(2,92) = 2.95, p = .06. As may be seen in Table 4, this effect was due to the Remitted group 
having better memory scores than the No Diagnosis group, F(1,86) = 5.81, p = .02. Though 
the Remitted group also had numerically higher memory scores than the Current Diagnosis 
group, the difference did not reach statistical significance, F(1,17) = 1.93, p = .18, likely in 
part due to low power to detect the effect. The No Diagnosis and Currently Depressed group 
did not differ from each other, F(1,82) = 0.21, p = .65.  
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In addition, there were significant effects of self-reported depressed status on RRS 
scores, F(2,92) = 9.07, p <.001. Specifically, post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test 
indicated that total scores on the RRS were significantly higher in the both Currently 
Depressed group (M = 55.43, SD = 11.46) and the Remitted Depression group (M = 47.58, 
SD = 7.95) than in the No Diagnosis group (M = 39.25, SD = 11.32); p = .001, and p = .04, 
respectively. There were no significant differences between the Currently Depressed and 
Remitted Depression group, p = .295.  
Self-reported depression status had significant effects on the Brooding, F(2,91) = 
4.49, p = .014,  Reflection, F(2,90) = 4.88, p = .01, and Depression, F(2,90) = 9.12, p < .001,  
subcomponents of the RRS. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test were conducted; 
all significant differences are reported. For the Brooding subsection, the Currently Depressed 
group (M = 13.14, SD = 4.34) exhibited significantly more brooding rumination than the No 
Diagnosis group (M = 9.48, SD = 3.16), p = .012. For the Reflection subsection, the 
Currently Depressed (M = 12.43, SD = 3.10) group exhibited significantly more reflective 
rumination than the No Diagnosis group (M = 8.99, SD = 3.40), p = .024. For the Depression 
subsection, the Currently Depressed group (M = 30.00, SD = 6.26) exhibited significantly 
more depressive rumination than the No Diagnosis group (M = 20.92, SD = 6.15), p = .002. 
The Remitted Depression group also (M = 26.25, SD = 5.86) exhibited significantly more 
depressive rumination than the No Diagnosis group, p = .017.  
Discussion 
 This study tested a novel theory about the relationship between rumination, cognitive 
deficits, and depression: namely, that chronic rumination may be a source of memory deficits 
in people with depression. This theory was tested experimentally by asking people to either 
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ruminate (or not) on a personally relevant story while performing a series of memory tests. 
The primary hypothesis was that experimental condition and depressive symptoms would 
have an interactive effect on auditory memory, such that asking people to ruminate would 
impact cognitive performance with increasing negative strength as depressive symptoms 
decreased. Thus, the rumination induction would decrease cognitive performance more for 
individuals with low depressive symptoms than for individuals with high depressive 
symptoms.  
Although the manipulation check was significant, there was no interaction effect 
between depressive symptoms and rumination for either auditory memory or visual memory. 
Even when depression was not included as a covariate, there was no impact of condition on 
participants’ memory scores. Therefore, the primary hypothesis was not supported. 
Moreover, supplementary analyses suggested that there was no relationship between 
depression and memory in the current sample, which contradicts prior research. If anything, 
having a chronic ruminative response tendency was associated with better memory. This 
relationship between chronic rumination and better memory supports the analytical 
rumination hypothesis proposed by Andrews and Thomson (2009).  
The only finding of the current study that replicated prior research was that 
rumination was associated with both depressive symptoms and self-reported diagnostic 
status. Not only was there a strong positive correlation between depressive symptoms and 
chronic rumination, people with any history of depression (current or remitted) had higher 
levels of chronic rumination than people with no history of depression.  
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Depression and Cognition 
 As reviewed in the introduction, although there is evidence for a relationship between 
depression and cognitive impairments, the exact nature of the deficits is unclear and likely 
moderated by study- and participant-related variables. There is relatively consistent evidence 
that people with depression show deficits in attention, memory, and executive functioning 
(e.g., Baune et al., 2014). Most meta-analyses and reviews that report memory deficits, 
however, do not further specify which domains of memory are measured (e.g., Rock et al., 
2013). Given these findings, this study hypothesized that depressive symptoms would 
correlate with decreased auditory and visual memory. This hypothesis was not supported. 
Not only were depressive symptoms uncorrelated with visual and verbal memory, the 
supplementary analyses indicated that people with remitted depression actually had better 
memory than people with no history of depression. There are at least three potential 
explanations for this hypothesis not being supported.  
First, it is possible that this study did not have enough participants with depression to 
detect differences in cognitive abilities. Given that the correlation between the BDI-II and 
AMI scores was both small and positive (r = .04) and that there appears to be a non-linear 
relationship between diagnostic status and memory, it is unlikely that statistical power is the 
underlying problem. It is, however, important to remember that both depressive symptoms 
and diagnostic status were based on self-report data. It is possible that a more rigorous 
measurement (e.g., a multi-measure, multi-perspective, or multi-setting paradigm) of 
depressive status would detect more cognitive differences.  
Second, it is possible that the test used to measure memory was not sufficiently 
sensitive to detect depression-related cognitive deficits. As previously discussed, there are 
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inconsistent findings about which cognitive domains are impaired in people with depression 
and how large the deficits are. Many factors complicate the relationship, including 
heterogeneity of measures. Even when the same measures are used, conflicting results have 
been found. For example, several studies have used the WMS-IV (Logical Memory in 
particular) to study verbal memory in people with depression and have found mixed results. 
Reppermund, Ising, Lucae, and Zihil (2008) found significant differences between patients 
with depression and healthy controls aged 22-58 years old (M = 43.5) on Logical Memory, 
but Korhonen et al. (2002) found no significant memory differences between adolescents 
with MDD (M = 18.9, SD = 2.0) and healthy participants on Logical Memory (M = 16.0, SD 
= 1.9). Inconsistent results using the WMS suggests that the measure is capable of detecting 
differences, however differences may not be reliably present. It is possible that Logical 
Memory is less capable of detecting memory differences in younger adults or that memory 
deficits are more common in older adults with depression, but definitive conclusions cannot 
be drawn because Reppermund et al. (2008) did not provide separate analyses for younger 
and older adults, although age was controlled for in their analyses.  
 Finally, it is possible that there is simply not a strong relationship between depressive 
symptoms and memory. The present study is not the first or only one to find these null 
effects; many other studies have failed to find a relationship between depression and 
cognitive deficits. For example, some studies have found evidence for impaired visual 
learning and memory (Matthews et al., 2008; Trivedi & Greer, 2014), but others have not 
(McClure, Rogeness, & Thompson, 1997). Thus, rather than being flawed due to sample size 
or test selection, it is possible that the current results support a notable subset of literature 
suggesting that depression is not marked by inherent cognitive deficits. 
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It is also possible, as suggested by some of the supplementary analyses, that the 
relationship between depressive symptoms and memory deficits may be more complex than 
was previously thought. In particular, it appears that although a ruminative response style is 
positively associated with depressive symptoms, it is also associated with better overall 
memory.  
Rumination and Cognition 
 The research reviewed previously suggests that rumination, and its future-oriented 
counterpart “worry” are cognitively demanding. This research focused on investigating how 
these processes impact working memory. For example, findings suggest that some 
ruminating individuals (measured by high scores on the RRS) exhibit working memory 
deficits while ruminating (Curci et al., 2013). Separate research has demonstrated verbal 
working memory deficits in high-worriers (Moreno et al., 2015). Nolen-Hoeksema et al. 
(2008) presented findings linking rumination and worrying, suggesting that while rumination 
and worrying are distinct processes, they share many underlying characteristics (such as 
repetitive and self-focused perseverative thoughts) and are associated with similar cognitive 
impairments (such as concentration and attention).  
The present research theorized that rumination may be characterized by similar 
deficits in verbal memory due to the shared characteristics presented by Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Wisco, and Lyubomirsky (2008). However, the experimentally induced rumination 
manipulation showed no impact on memory scores. In addition, the RRS scores showed a 
positive relationship with memory ability, indicating that individuals who report higher levels 
of habitual rumination actually have better overall memory than individuals who report lower 
levels of habitual rumination. One possibility for this finding is that rumination and worrying 
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may not be as related as previously theorized. It is also possible that rumination is not 
uniformly deleterious. 
 Beyond the obvious difference in time orientation between rumination (past focused) 
and worry (future focused), there are several factors that differentiate worry and rumination 
that may explain why worrying correlates with impaired verbal memory but rumination 
correlates with improved verbal memory. When worrying, one is contemplating an event 
with uncertain outcomes but when ruminating, one is rehashing a past event (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008). It is possible that worrying requires more cognitive resources 
because individuals are required to generate possible outcomes, whereas rumination does not 
require such creative thinking, as the outcome has already been determined. As a result, 
rumination would not have the same harmful effect on verbal memory as worrying. 
Moreover, research on past vs. future thinking suggests that thinking about the future is more 
strongly related to working memory capacity than thinking about the past (Hill & Emery, 
2013). 
A second related possibly is that, rather than rumination either reducing cognitive 
resources or competing with access to the phonological loop, a ruminative response style 
serves as practice for rehearsing verbal information. It is also possible that individuals with 
better memory abilities are more prone to rumination. After all, a person cannot ruminate on 
a past that they cannot remember.  
One piece of evidence in support of these ideas is the correlations between the 
subsections of the RRS and AMI scores. Of the three subsections of the RRS, the reflection 
subsection is most highly correlated with AMI scores. Reflection items on the RRS are 
neutrally valenced and operationalize rumination as the engagement in contemplation (i.e., 
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“write down what you are thinking and analyze it”). Neutral contemplation of past events, 
rather than brooding on the negative feelings associated with the event, may simply be a 
productive method of rehearsal. 
One puzzling contradiction in this study’s findings is that although the rumination 
manipulation was successful, and although RRS scores were positively associated with 
memory ability, there were no significant differences in memory ability between the 
experimental conditions. The lack of relationship between condition and memory scores 
suggests that the rumination manipulation, despite inducing participants to think more about 
their personal narrative, may tap into something different than habitual rumination. It is also 
possible that the rumination manipulation does successfully induce rumination, but in-the-
moment rumination has different effects than long-term rumination. A third possibility is that 
the rumination induction was not strong enough, and people in the rumination condition 
weren’t thinking enough about their memory to make a difference; even in the rumination 
condition, scores on the manipulation check were low (M = 2.37). 
If the reason habitual rumination is correlated with higher memory scores is due to 
prior practice rehearsing verbal information, then it logically follows that the rumination 
induction should not necessarily result in better AMI scores. Participants in the rumination 
condition are not all high habitual ruminators, thus they have different levels of practice 
rehearsing verbal information. This indicates that it is the past experience with rumination 
that is associated with higher AMI scores, and not active rumination in the moment.  
Future Analyses 
 Within this dataset, two additional analyses may help to understand the observed 
patterns in the data. First, experimenters anecdotally noted that there was a wide variance of 
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the intensity of the negative stories. It is possible that differences in the severity of negative 
stories told in participants’ narratives may be impacting the results. For example, some 
subgroups (such as women or individuals with increased depressive symptoms) may 
consistently give more negative narratives than others. Although analyzing the narratives was 
beyond the scope of this thesis, I plan to transcribe and analyze the narratives in two ways. 
First, I will process the narratives using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 
software, which can provide counts for negative and positive emotion words. This allows for 
an object quantification of the negativity of the narratives. In addition, the transcripts will be 
subjectively scored by raters to estimate differences in emotional significance.  
 In addition, narratives can be analyzed to create a secondary, indirect manipulation 
check. All narratives were recorded during the first and second recitations. If the rumination 
manipulation was effect, it is possible that participants in the rumination condition would be 
more accurate in the retelling of their stories than participants in the control condition. To test 
this, raters blind to condition could compare the first and second versions of the narratives 
and calculate a percentage of details participants accurately provide in the second telling. 
Limitations 
 One major limitation of this study is that no direct measure of affect was 
administered. Thus, it is not possible to know how the negative mood induction affected 
participants or if there were systematic differences in participants’ experiences of negative 
affect. Rumination passively rehearses negative, personally-relevant, emotional content. 
Without a direct mood measure, it is not possible to determine if participants’ moods were 
impacted enough to result in a thinking pattern that truly reflects rumination. It is possible 
that participants were successfully verbally rehearsing their narratives, but did not feel lasting 
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negative repercussions. As described above, analyzing negative and positive words from 
participants’ narratives can serve as an indirect measure of affect, partially mitigating this 
problem. 
 The restricted variability in BDI-II scores may also have been a limiting factor. The 
restricted range of BDI-II scores and positively skewed distribution may have limited the 
ability to detect significant differences due to depressive symptoms. It should be noted, 
however, that there were still robust correlations between BDI-II scores and rumination 
measures, suggesting that BDI-II scores were variable enough to detect strong relationships.  
 Another potential limitation is that participants were all between the ages of 18 and 
23 years old. Past research has found conflicting evidence of cognitive impairments in 
depression, with some studies yielding no significant findings while others find cognitive 
deficits. A review focusing on adolescence and early adulthood reported mixed results for 
working memory and visual memory deficits in depression, but no effects of depression on 
attention or verbal memory. Furthermore, young adults at high- and low-risk for depression 
have been shown to not perform significantly differently on a working memory task (Mannie 
et al., 2010). These findings, in combination with the current results, suggest that cognitive 
deficits in depression may be more prevalent in middle-aged or older- adults than in young 
adults. The cognitive effects of both depression and rumination may have been more robust if 
this study included middle- and older-adults in the sample.    
 A fourth possible limitation is the statistically significant difference between AMI 
and VMI scores. Participants performed above average on visual memory tasks, but not 
verbal memory tasks. This difference cannot be explicitly explained by the current data. One 
possible explanation is that the mood induction altered performance on either the visual or 
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verbal memory tasks. Additionally, it is possible that there are unique characteristics to this 
sample, resulting in improved visual memory.  
Conclusions and Future Directions  
Subsequent studies should further investigate the relationship between rumination and 
worrying. The current study found that habitual rumination, as measured by the RRS, is 
associated with improved verbal memory, which challenges previous theories that rumination 
may have cognitive effects similar to worrying. No measure of habitual worrying was 
included in this study, thus the relationship between worrying and verbal memory cannot be 
analyzed. Future research could include both measures of worrying and rumination when 
measuring cognition to determine if these processes are as linked as past research has 
theorized.  
Future studies aiming to experimentally manipulate rumination should consider 
possible changes to increase the strength of the induction. It is possible that the induced 
rumination was not long-lasting enough to significantly affect all memory tests. To address 
this problem, the memory battery could be shortened. Additionally, the variability in the 
severity of the narratives may have resulted in the rumination induction not being uniformly 
strong. Future studies could assign participants a specific topic to ruminate about to reduce 
this variability. For example, the experimenter could provide false positive, neutral, or 
negative feedback to participants on a personality or intelligence measure and ask 
participants to reflect on the feedback. This would ensure that all participants are ruminating 
about a similar, but still self-relevant, topic.  
Another finding to further investigate is the relationship between memory and the 
subcomponents of rumination. Present correlational findings suggest that reflective 
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rumination is positively correlated to verbal memory, but the other two subcomponents 
(brooding and depression) are not. Future studies should seek to disentangle the cognitive 
effects of these three subcomponents.   
Ultimately, this study provides valuable insight to the relationship between cognition 
and rumination. The present results suggest that rumination may not be as cognitively 
harmful as previously thought. The positive relationship between rumination and verbal 
memory does not easily fit into the literature which has found correlations between 1) 
increased rumination and increased depressive symptoms and 2) increased depressive 
symptoms and decreased cognitive functioning. Though rumination is associated with 
decreased mood and increased mental illness, it is possible that rumination may be 
cognitively beneficial.  
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Table 1 
BAI, BDI-II, RRS, and RRS Subsections Descriptive Statistics 
Measure M SD 
BAI 10.34 8.95 
BDI-II 8.39 6.51 
RRS: Total 41.43 11.84 
RRS: Depression 22.17 6.62 
RRS: Brooding 9.83 3.29 
RRS: Reflection 9.49 3.38 
 
Note. BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory. RRS = Ruminative 
Response Scale. 
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Table 2 
Mean Beck Depression Inventory-II Scores by Diagnostic and Medication Status 
 
 
 
Note. Where SD = 0, N = 1. 
 
 
 Current Antidepressant Medication?  
Diagnostic Status No Yes 
Current Depression Diagnosis M = 31.0, SD = 0.0 M = 18.8, SD = 7.0 
Remitted Depression Diagnosis M = 8.1, SD = 6.4 M = 19.7, SD = 9.7 
No History of Depression M = 6.8, SD = 4.6 M = 12.0, SD = 0.0 
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Table 3 
Correlations Between BDI-II, RRS, and Memory Scores 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. BDI-II --             
2. RRS Total .60** --           
3. RRS Depression .65** .95** --         
4. RRS Brooding .50** .83** .70** --       
5. RRS Reflection .35** .84** .70** .58** --     
6. AMI Score .04  .18 .16 .04 .23* --   
7. VMI Score -.04 .15 .15 .13 .10 .33** -- 
 
Note. **p <.001, * p <.05. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; RRS = Ruminative Response 
Scale; AMI = WMS-IV Auditory Memory Index; VMI = WMS-IV Visual Memory Index. 
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Table 4 
Auditory and Visual Memory Index Descriptive Statistics 
  Memory Index 
Diagnostic Status AMI VMI 
Current Depression M = 96.57, SD = 13.54 M = 107.57, SD = 9.31 
Prior Depression M = 104.83, SD = 7.94 M = 109.75, SD = 11.93 
No Depression M = 97.24, SD = 11.46 M = 103.46, SD = 11.73 
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Figure 1. Process Model of Emotion Regulation. Reprinted from Handbook in Emotion 
Regulation (p. 7) by J. J. Gross, 2014, New York, NY: Guilford. 
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Figure 2. Impact of Experimental Condition and BDI-II scores on Auditory Memory (Left) 
and Visual Memory (Right). Plots were made using parameter estimates, with BDI-II Scores 
at +/- 1 SD below the mean. 
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1 
10/10/14 version 
Consent to Participate in Research 
Information to Consider About this Research 
 
Memory Recognition and Cognition 
Principal Investigator: Kathryn Hardin 
Department: Psychology 
Contact Information:   
Kathryn Hardin – PI 
hardinkl@appstate.edu 
(940) 393 – 5137 
 
Dr. Emery – Faculty Advisor 
emerylj@appstate.edu  
828-262-2272, ext. 416 
You are being invited to take part in a research study about memory recollection and cognition. 
If you take part in this study, you will be one of about 75 people to do so.  By doing this study we 
hope to learn about cognitive performance and memory.  
 
The research procedures will be conducted on the second floor of Smith-Wright on the campus 
of Appalachian State University. 
 
You will be asked to describe in detail a recent memory, which will be audio recorded. 
Additionally, you complete a set of standardized cognitive tests with the experimenter and fill out 
a number of questionnaires on your own. You cannot volunteer for this study if you are under 18 
years of age. 
 
What are possible harms or discomforts that I might experience during the research? 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the risk of harm for participating in this research study is no more 
than you would experience in everyday life.   
 
What are the possible benefits of this research? 
 
There may be no personal benefit from your participation but the information gained by doing 
this research may help others in the future by expanding the scientific community’s 
understanding of the relationship between memory recollection and cognition.   
 
Will I be paid for taking part in the research? 
 
We will compensate you for the time you volunteer while being in this study. Participants 
participating for class credit will receive 3 ELC credits.  
 
ELC Credit: You will not be paid for your participation in this study.  However, you can earn 3 
ELC credits for your participation.  There are other research options and non-research options 
for obtaining extra credit or ELC's.  One non-research option to receive 1 ELC is to read an 
article and write a 1-2 page paper summarizing the article and your reaction to the article.  More 
information about this option can be found at: psych.appstate.edu/research.  You may also wish 
to consult your professor to see if other non-research options are available. 
 
Non ELC Credit: Participants who are not eligible for ELC credits will receive $20. Payment will 
be paid in full in the event that you chose to end the study early. 
 
How will you keep my private information confidential? 
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We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that 
you gave us information or what that information is. Your data will only be associated with a 
subject number, which will not be linked with your name. Data will be kept indefinitely but will be 
stripped of any personal identifiers.  
 
Who can I contact if I have questions? 
 
The people conducting this study will be available to answer any questions concerning this 
research, now or in the future.  You may contact the Principal Investigator at 
hardinkl@appstate.edu. If you have questions about your rights as someone taking part in 
research, contact the Appalachian Institutional Review Board Administrator at 828-262-2692 
(days), through email at irb@appstate.edu or at Appalachian State University, Office of 
Research and Sponsored Programs, IRB Administrator, Boone, NC 28608. 
 
Do I have to participate?  What else should I know? 
 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  If you choose not to volunteer, there 
will be no penalty and you will not lose any benefits or rights you would normally have.  If you 
decide to take part in the study you still have the right to decide at any time that you no longer 
want to continue. There will be no penalty and no loss of benefits or rights if you decide at any 
time to stop participating in the study.  If you decide to participate in this study, let the research 
personnel know. A copy of this consent form is yours to keep. 
 
This research project has been approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Appalachian 
State University.  
 
This study was approved on:  September 26, 2016 
This approval will expire on September 25, 2017 unless the IRB renews the approval of this 
research. 
 
 
 
 
 
             
Participant's Name  (PRINT)                                 Signature                           Date 
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Appendix B 
Demographics Information 
 
1. Age: ___________ 
 
 
2. Gender: ___________ 
 
 
3. Ethnic Background:  
a. American Indian or Alaskan Native 
b. Asian or Pacific Islander 
c. African American, Black (Not Hispanic origin) 
d. Hispanic 
e. Caucasian, White (Not Hispanic origin) 
f. Other 
 
4. Have you been diagnosed with a depressive disorder? 
a. Yes, and am currently feeling depressed 
b. Yes, but am not currently feeling depressed 
c. No history of depression 
d. Prefer not to answer 
 
5. Are you currently taken any anti-depressant medication? 
 
 
Yes ________  No  ________ 
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